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Abstract— The security event correlation scalability has 
become a major concern for security analysts and IT 
administrators when considering complex IT infrastructures 
that need to handle gargantuan amounts of events or wide 
correlation window spans. The current correlation 
capabilities of Security Information and Event Management 
(SIEM), based on a single node in centralized servers, have 
proved to be insufficient to process large event streams. This 
paper introduces a step forward in the current state of the 
art to address the aforementioned problems. The proposed 
model takes into account the two main aspects of this field: 
distributed correlation and query parallelization. We 
present a case study of a multiple-step attack on the Olympic 
Games IT infrastructure to illustrate the applicability of our 
approach. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Current Security Information and Event Management 
(SIEM) technology is not scalable. Basically, it relies on 
centralized servers, and when the load for a server is too 
high, either the number of events processed by the SIEM 
server is reduced artificially (by filtering events) or the 
load is split across different servers in disjoint manner [1] 
[2] . The latter approach results in the inability to correlate 
events processed at different SIEM servers. However, 
there is an increasing need to use the SIEM technology to 
protect large scale Information Technology (IT) 
infrastructures by taking into account even more hard 
security requirements. 
In this paper we describe how we dealt with scalability 
issues of SIEMs in the MASSIF project [3] , and in 
particular we focus on a new technology based on parallel-
distributed complex event processing (CEP) [4] . We 
demonstrate that it is suitable to improve the capabilities of 
the SIEM correlation servers and satisfy the requirements 
above. We defined the operational requirements of the 
correlation engine based on the challenging use case of the 
Olympic Games IT infrastructure [5] , whose security is 
managed by one of the project partners, namely the Atos 
Company. Indeed, the success of the Olympic Games 
events highly depend on the IT infrastructure, and due to 
its particular nature of being a non-repeatable event, it 
requires very high levels of security. On the other hand, the 
Olympic Games IT infrastructure has grown significantly 
and it is posing difficult challenges to cope with the 
security events that the SIEM has to process. The very 
nature of the Games’ IT security operations, which involve 
initial planning and build up until the last-minute massive 
deployment, causes huge sudden peaks in the number of 
events produced and highlights the need to correlate 
distant and potentially related events. Security events 
produced during the preparation and build-up stage, in 
which testing of the whole IT infrastructure implies many 
configuration changes and temporary decreases in the 
security levels, need to be able to be correlated with others 
produced live during the Games, weeks or months later. In 
this sense, there is a clear need for a versatile, elastic, and 
scalable correlation engine. 
The MASSIF SIEM is a next generation SIEM system 
that provides a number of novelties. In this paper we focus 
on one of its most innovative features: the scalability of the 
correlation engine. Specifically, a number of security 
directives or rules are typically defined and deployed on 
the correlation servers in order to detect the suspicious 
activities preceding an attack; the directives describe how 
to identify the most significant security events occurring in 
the infrastructure. The SIEM workflow operates by 
collecting events from the monitored systems and by 
correlating them in order to check for conditions defined in 
the rules above. Finally, the SIEM raises alarms when such 
conditions are verified. These rules are basically 
continuous queries over streaming events. When the 
stream of events is too large to be handled by a single 
node, then a centralized complex event processing (CEP) 
system cannot simply process the stream of incoming 
events. Parallelization into different multiple nodes also 
signifies improvements in another event correlation 
dimension: increased memory for storing past events to 
effectively extend the time window in which isolated but 
related events can be correlated, and enable detection of 
“low and slow” attacks, among others. As “low and slow” 
attacks we understand those where an attacker tries to 
tamper the system, but the stages of the attack are distant 
in time to prevent detection by the SIEM system. 
In MASSIF, in order to scale this complex event 
processing we have designed and implemented a CEP 
engine that is able to process CEP queries in a parallel-
distributed manner. To this aim, the CEP queries can be 
split into subqueries deployable on different nodes. This is 
what is known as intra-query parallelism. However, this 
kind of parallelism might not be enough for massive event 
streams since the processing of the events for a subquery 
might require more resources than a single node. For this 
reason, in M A S S I F , we have also implemented intra-
operator parallelism. Intra-operator parallelism enables to 
run a subquery on a set of nodes to share the load of a 
single subquery across several nodes and, so, to scale the 
processing of massive event streams. 
Operators are the building blocks of C E P queries. The 
C E P operators are used to filter (filter operator), transform 
(map operator), aggregate (aggregate operator) and 
correlate (join operator) events. The logic of the intra-
operator parallelism is also encapsulated as special C E P 
operators. 
The paper follows the following structure: in Section I I 
the Olympic Games use case scenario as motivation of the 
work, taking a particular security rule as example. Then, in 
Section I I I , we map a security rule extracted from the 
scenario to a C E P query. This security rule is meant to 
reflect and detect a low and slow brute force attack, in 
which the events related to the attack can be numerous but 
separated by long periods of time and also be clumped 
together in high numbers at a time. In this section, the 
focus is more on the low and slow aspect of the attack. In 
Section I V , we present the M A S S I F distributed processing 
event correlation engine and show how to translate a 
security rule into a C E P query and how this query is 
parallelized to reach the processing capabilities required to 
detect a brute force attack. This enables us to show how 
the implemented correlation engine is prepared to detect 
two extreme examples of attacks which can be part of the 
same attack (variable number of events very distant in time 
versus high peak numbers at a time). Finally, in Section V 
we present our conclusions. 
I I . OLYMPIC GAMES USE CASE SCENARIO 
One of the use case scenarios used to demonstrate the 
M A S S I F S I E M key features is the Olympic Games I T 
infrastructure. In this scenario, the main task for the 
M A S S I F S I E M is to protect the I T infrastructure from any 
threat which can impact any part of the result chain and 
associated services. The Olympic Games, supported by the 
I T team of Atos, must successfully issue and activate more 
than 200,000 accreditations for Games that comprise 
around 300 events representing over 4,500 hours of live 
competition. Live commentator services are delivered for 
around 26 sports. More than 15 million information pages 
are viewed, with peaks of 1 million pages viewed on 
specific days. Over 3 G B of live results are provided in 
around 800,000 messages to the Olympic website, 
broadcasters and sports federations. This colossal event 
easily spans over more than 60 competition and non-
competition venues, involving more than 10,500 athletes, 
27,000 members of the accredited media or 70,000 
volunteers. The intensity and complexity of this kind of 
sporting event presents a big challenge to ordinary S I E M 
infrastructure, mainly, due to two very characteristic 
features: the number of security event types (about 
20,000), and the volume of generated events to be handled 
(around 11 million alerts per day). 
In M A S S I F project a testbed deployment has been 
created to simulate a simplified environment of the 
Olympic Games IT infrastructure in order to reproduce 
some of the misuse cases defined in this scenario, such as 
low and slow attacks, vulnerability scanning, and privilege 
escalation. Some Games services are accessible over the 
Internet. This includes the accreditation and sport entries 
applications that national Olympic committees use to 
register their athletes and dignitaries. Being one of the few 
external entry points to the Games infrastructure, the 
attacker can start from there and scan for well-known 
vulnerabilities. Figure 1. depicts the different servers 
considered in the simulation, as well as the misuse cases 
and their attack targets. The solid line represents the attack 
flow, whereas the dashed line represents the result of a 
successful attack. 
Figure 1. Olympic Games testbed 
This scenario has highlighted the limits of current 
S I E M technologies. In most of the misuse cases defined in 
the Olympic Games scenario the malicious activities of an 
attacker can span over several days and even weeks. 
Correlation rules that are used in current SIEMs apply to 
short periods of time (e.g. numbers of recurrent events 
happening during an hour) and it is impossible to correlate 
isolated, but related, events that happen during long 
periods of time. Indeed, correlating events produced during 
the celebration of the games with others from weeks or 
months before represents itself a big challenge as well as a 
significant potential improvement to the security of the 
Games. This would enable the detection of potential 
attacks initiated during the preparation of the Games by 
internal Atos staff (as well as outside attackers), and meant 
to reach their climax once the Games are underway for 
maximum impact. 
I I I . MAPPING THE USE CASE TO A C E P QUERY 
Among the possible misuse cases defined into the 
Olympic Games scenario, we have focused on the one 
named “data tampering and privilege escalation on web 
server”, which reflects the first stage of a complex multi-
step attack meant to eventually access accreditation data of 
the Games’ staff and competitors (among others), as 
depicted in the above figure. A malicious user decides to 
attack the Accreditation web server of the Olympic Games 
infrastructure by taking advantage of reported remote 
execution vulnerabilities in the software stack used [6] [7] , 
in order to guess an admin password (“privilege 
escalation”). The attacker successfully deploys a malicious 
Java Server Page (JSP) implementing a shell into a web 
application run by the JBoss application server [8] ; we call 
this the “data tampering” step. To deploy the shell, the 
attacker leverages the remote execution to deploy a new 
JSP in the JBoss work folder. Upon normal invocation 
using a web browser, the JSP gets dynamically compiled 
and executed. Once the malicious JSP is deployed, the 
attacker follows a “low and slow” approach to brute force 
the password of a local Windows administrative account 
over two weeks; this is the called “privilege escalation” 
step. 
In order to detect this attack on the MASSIF CEP 
correlation engine, the data format of the event stream has 
to be defined. An event stream is characterized by a 
schema that defines all the relevant fields. In this particular 
misuse case all the information about the attack is 
collected by a Windows System iNtrusion Analysis and 
Reporting Environment (SNARE) agent, which becomes 
the only data feed for the CEP engine. The SNARE agent 
feeds a MASSIF component called “Generic Event 
Translator”[5] , which is in charge of extracting the data 
fields from the messages and forward them to the CEP. 
TABLE I. lists the fields extracted from the syslog 
messages used for the CEP input stream. 
The attack is detected in two steps. First, events related 
to the creation of files into a specific server folder are 
identified. Once the first event has been detected, we look 
for a certain number of login failed events on the same 
server using an event window of 2 weeks. If the number of 
failed login attempts detected in that period of time 
exceeds a defined threshold, an alarm is generated. 
Figure 2. shows graphically the query used to detect 
the “data tampering and privilege escalation on web 
server” attack. 
TABLE I. EVENT FIELDS EXTRACTED FOR CEP SCHEMA 
Figure 2. Privilege escalation: CEP query. 
Five CEP operators compose the query. The semantic 
of each operator is listed sequentially below: 
• Filter: it filters out all the input events but the one 
with EventType 4663, an object was created in a 
given folder path, or 4625, login failed. 
• Join: it joins all the login failed events received 
after the reception of a 4663 event in a time 
window of 2 weeks. 
• Aggregate: this operator counts the events coming 
from the Join and it generates a new output event 
when the number of received events in a time 
window of 2 weeks is greater than a predefined 
threshold. 
• Map: the two map operators are used to generate 
alarms. The first one creates a low priority alarm 
any time a new file is created on the server (event 
4663). The second map is used to create a high 
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Finally, Figure 3. shows a screenshot of the test 
environment where the experiment was run. It shows the 
messages related to the events that pass the filter and also 
the messages corresponding to the alarms. The first 
correlation rule detects the write access to the JBoss 
application server folder and generates a first low-level 
alarm.Once this alarm is produced, the second rule detects 
10 (in this case) failed login attempts distant in time and 
reports a higher-level alarm. 
Figure 3. “Privilege escalation on web server” detection 
IV. M A S S I F S I E M PARALLEL EVENT CORRELATION 
ENGINE 
M A S S I F S I E M aims at protecting large and complex 
distributed systems. Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities at 
several points of these systems, from the network layer to 
the application layer. Furthermore, attacks cannot be 
detected just by monitoring a single system layer but it 
needs to collect and correlate all the data produced by 
sensors distributed across the system. These heterogeneous 
sensor data must be filtered, aggregated and correlated in 
order to detect and report potential attacks. The event 
correlation engine of the M A S S I F S I E M is the component 
in charge of processing these data and sending alarms to 
other M A S S I F components that will apply the 
countermeasures. 
The M A S S I F S I E M correlation engine is a parallel-
distributed Complex Event Processing (CEP) system. The 
streaming operators available in the engine can be 
parallelized across an arbitrary number of nodes allowing 
the engine to scale with respect the input data volume. 
Queries are specified in X M L schemas telling the engine 
which event patterns must be detected in the incoming 
event stream. A query is an acyclic direct graph of 
operators where each operator takes input events on their 
incoming edges and route output events on their outgoing 
edges. Queries are split into sub-queries and each sub-
query can be deployed in an arbitrary set of nodes. The 
operators are organized into four categories: 
• Stateless operators: these operators process one 
event at a time and the produced output events, if 
any, are based only on the information contained 
by the processed event. Operators such as Filter 
and Map are examples in this category. 
• Stateful operators: these operators are equipped 
with a window in which they store a certain 
number of events. The computation of the output 
events is based on all the events stored in the 
window. Join and Aggregate are the most 
important examples of stateful operators because 
they allow performing operations such as 
aggregation and correlation. 
• Database operators: these operators allow the C E P 
engine to correlate events with stored information 
in databases as well as to store events in a 
database. 
• Parallelization operators: the Semantic Router and 
the Event Merger are the operators that 
encapsulate the parallelization logic. In particular 
these operators are in charge of managing the 
event routing among sub-queries when one or 
more operators are parallelized. 
A. Parallelization Strategy 
The parallelization strategy of the MASSIF correlation 
engine is completely encapsulated into the parallelization 
operators. These operators are deployed on the outgoing 
and incoming edges of each sub-query. Specifically, 
Semantic Router operators are in charge of routing the 
output events produced by a particular sub-query to the 
nodes running in the subsequent sub-queries. While 
Semantic Router operators are deployed on the outgoing 
edges of a sub-query, Event Merger operators are always 
deployed on the incoming edges because they merge the 
incoming streams from all the upstream nodes and feed the 
local sub-query with a single, timestamp-ordered stream. 
Event Merger operators are independent from the 
operator categories deployed in the local sub-query, this 
means that their behavior is independent of the kind of 
operator and they perform a merge sort based on the 
timestamp field and feed the sub-query with a new single 
timestamp ordered stream. The Semantic Router operators 
have knowledge about the semantics of the operators 
deployed in the following sub-queries because they must 
guarantee that all events that need to be aggregated or 
correlated together are actually received by the same sub-
query instance. 
Let us consider a simple query composed by two sub-
queries A and B. Consider that the query is parallelized 
deploying the sub-query A on m nodes, and the sub-query 
B on n nodes as shown in Figure 4. The Semantic Routers 
of sub-cluster A make sure that all the tuples that have to 
be correlated and aggregated together are routed to the 
same downstream node. The input mergers take care of 
providing a single merged stream of events that is 
timestamp ordered. 
Figure 4. Simple query parallelization. 
B. Scalability Evaluation 
The scalability of the MASSIF CEP engine will be 
shown using the query from the Olympic Games scenario 
depicted in Figure 5. , the one about brute force attacks. 
The query is divided into two sub-queries, the first sub-
query contains one filter operator that let pass only events 
of failed login attempts, and the second sub-query contains 
the other three operators that are used to count how many 
login failed attempts happened in a certain time interval. 
We run two experiments, one experiment deploying the 
full query on a single node and another one parallelizing 
the first sub-query (the heaviest one) on 10 nodes and 
deploying the second sub-query on a different node. The 
data set containing the brute force attacks were created 
using an ad hoc data generator. 
The evaluation is being made at UPM testbed. UPM 
testbed is a shared-nothing cluster of 100 nodes (blades) 
with 320 cores. All blades are Supermicro SYS-5015M-
MF+ equipped with 8GB of RAM and 1Gbit Ethernet and 
a directly attached 0.5TB hard disk. Blades are distributed 
into 4 racks: Rack 1 has 20 blades, with a dual-core Intel 
PentiumD@2.8GHz. Rack 2 has 20 blades, with a dual-
core Intel Xeon 3040@1.86GHz. Rack 3 and rack 4 have 
30 blades, each with a quad-core Intel Xeon 
X3220@2.40GHz. 
Figure 6. and Figure 7. show same statistic graphs 
related to the filter operator of the first sub-query during 
the two experiments. Each figure has six graphs, namely: 
Input Stream Rates that reports the number of tuple 
processed per second, Output Stream Rates that reports the 
number of tuples per second produced in output, Cost that 
indicates the percentage of the total CPU consumed by a 
particular operator of the sub-query, Queue length that 
indicates the size of the operator buffers, CPU that reports 
the CPU utilization in the node where the sub-query 
(containing the selected operator) is running, and finally 
Size that reports the number of nodes on which is deployed 
the operator. It is worth noting that the statistics reported 
on Figure 7. are the aggregated values of all the nodes 
employed for the operator. 
Focusing on the size graphs, it is possible to see that, as 
we said before, in the first case the filter is deployed on 1 
node only and in the second case on 10 nodes. 
Furthermore, comparing the two Input Stream Rates 
graphs we can see how moving from 1 node deployment to 
a 10 node deployment, the maximum supported load is 
increased from 20,000 tuples per second to 200,000 tuples 
per second. As can be seen the MASSIF CEP scales 
almost linearly because moving from 1 node deployment 
to an 11 node deployment the maximum supported load 
has increased by 10 times. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented the scalable event correlation 
engine of the MASSIF SIEM and motivated it through a 
real scenario such as the one of the Olympic Games IT 
infrastructure. This event correlation engine is able to 
parallelize arbitrary SIEM security rules that are expressed 
as CEP queries that detect potential attacks. The CEP 
queries can be deployed on a large number of nodes to 
scale with respect to i) the volume of the security event 
streams (increased processing capabilities) as well as to ii) 
the timeframe in which two related events might take place 
(increased memory and extended correlation window 
capabilities). 
Figure 5. Brute force attack query. 
Figure 6. Statistics of the centralized deployment (1 node) 
Figure 7. Statistics of the distributed deployment (11 nodes) 
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